The Ottoman Government and the
End of the Ottoman Social Formation, 1915-1917
by Hilmar Kaiser
Since the Ottoman Empire’s
foundation in late Middle Ages, deportation programs were a common
feature of Ottoman administration in Asia Minor and the Balkans. In
general, the Ottoman elite sought to replace potentially troublesome
communities with peasant populations which were easy to control and
tax. A primary goal of such displacements was the sedentarization of
the deported nomads. After the conquest of a region or town, Ottoman
sultans used deportations as a tool to re-populate devastated areas.
Therefore, demographic engineering was an important device for
securing the central government’s hold over its territory and
population. It also provided the necessary human resources for
further developing the economic basis of this agrarian society. The
extensive use of land by nomads could not provide the revenue needed
for the upkeep of the Ottoman military and bureaucracy.
Following military setbacks during the
17th and 18th centuries, the central government
lost in part its direct control over the provinces. In the process,
local strong men secured a degree of independence from direct
interference in local affairs on the part of the Constantinople
authorities. In regions like Kurdistan, Albania, Egypt, but also in
some areas on the Aegean littoral of Asia Minor, these local rulers
were able to secure for themselves a large part of the revenue.
During the Tanzimat (Reforms) period of the 19th century,
successive imperial administrations sought to reassert full control
over all territories. With the exception of Egypt, Ottoman armies
eliminated local contenders for power in a series of bloody military
campaigns. While the destruction of internal competition stabilized
the rule of ‘reform’ elites at the imperial center, other
competitors were more difficult to deal with. European powers had
emerged as a formidable challenge. By 1878, Russia, Britain,
Austro-Hungary, and France had gained full possession of former
Ottoman provinces in the Balkans, North Africa, and the Caucasus,
while in some areas, like Cyprus and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ottoman
sovereignty only continued nominally. Unable to match the challenge
militarily, the Ottoman government sought to preempt the danger of
further territorial losses by stabilizing its control through new
settlement programs. Accordingly, the administration sent out
fact-finding missions to areas that had just returned to direct
central control and were considered as being threatened by outside
intervention. Especially, large coastal plains that were sparsely
inhabited and promised some economic potential became the focus of
ambitious settlement projects. Muslim refugees and emigrants from
those areas lost to newly independent states in the Balkans or other
regions recently conquered by Russia in the Caucasus formed the
majority of settlers. Many of these pioneers died within a short time
because of lack of provisions and unhealthy conditions. Consequently,
within a few years some districts were re-settled several times with
new immigrants building their homes almost literally over the graves
of the deceased earlier arrivals. It seems that the central
authorities accepted such losses of human life as the price for the
success of central policies. As long as enough Muslims were willing
to settle in the Ottoman Empire the program was in no danger.
However, when the flow of immigrants ebbed down, the government tried
to attract immigrants with promises that were not to be kept.
A second focus of the settlement program
became those districts where Armenians peasants and small town
dwellers formed a solid demographic majority. Here, the Ottoman
government used Muslim immigrants and Kurdish nomads who were eager
to settle down as a tool to change local demographics. Already by the
1870s, the expropriation of Armenian lands had reached an extent that
the Armenian ecclesiatical leadership felt compelled to appeal to the
Ottoman government to bring about change. However, Armenian efforts
were without avail. Being frustrated in its efforts for a solution,
the Armenian leadership turned to European Powers in 1878. This way,
the Armenian Question was established as a constant item on the
agenda of the European Concert for years to come. In other words, the
attempts at strengthening central control in outlying provinces in
order to thwart off foreign intervention produced increasingly
adverse results as the central government was unwilling to take into
consideration the interests of the local non-Muslim population.
In response to European demands at reform
in the Armenian provinces, the Ottoman government sought to create a
counter weight against the perceived danger of outside intervention
and internal Armenian challenges. It invited some Kurdish tribes to
enter special relations with the Ottoman sultan. The government
enlisted these in irregular cavalry regiments that resembled the
Russian cossak units. These tribes enjoyed a degree of leniency to
prey on rival Kurdish tribes that had not been enlisted, but their
first targets were the sedentary, unarmed Armenian villagers. In
1894-1896, in a wave of massacres that claimed tens of thousands of
lives, numerous Armenian communities were either completely destroyed
or critically reduced. The Kurdish invaders established themselves on
occupied Armenian property for good. While no large-scale massacres
took place in the years leading up to the revolution of 1908, the
expropriation of Armenian peasants continued throughout the period on
a slower and less spectacular pace.
The autocratic rule of Abdul Hamid II and
its repressive methods gave birth not only to Armenian and Balkan
Christian opposition parties. Among the Muslim population a spectrum
of Muslim opposition groups came into being, formed after a series of
re-organizations the ‘Committee of Union and Progress’
(CUP). In 1908, the CUP together with Armenian and other allies
overthrew the autocratic rule of the Empire and established a
representative monarchy. Within months, the victorious coalition
faced a serious threat when in April 1909 a counter-revolution sought
to re-institute autocracy. In the course of the rising, religious
circles organized large massacres in the province of Adana and
adjacent districts. About 30,000 Armenians, but also Greeks and
Assyrians, were slaughtered. Similar massacres had been prepared in
other provinces as well. But only in the boom region of Adana the
instigators met with success as intense competition for land and jobs
had created favorable conditions for their designs.
The Adana massacres made it clear to the CUP
that its future policy had to take into consideration the interests
of certain Muslim elites. These elites possessed large estates and
controlled politics on a local level. The notables had been allied
with the old autocracy and profited from its anti-Armenian policy.
Therefore, the CUP found itself in a dilemma. It could not win over
the Muslim landed elites without antagonizing its Armenian allies.
The latter insisted on the restitution of Armenian lands that had
been illegaly takenover by the Muslim notables and their dependent
settlers. In the end, the CUP did not resolve the conflict. For a
time, it followed a stalling policy, making promises to its Armenian
allies while not touching the interests of Muslim notables. Even more
so, the CUP increasingly integrated the landed Muslim elites in its
own party organization. Not surprisingly, the resulting conflicts
between the CUP and the Armenian leadership lead to an end of the
political alliance in 1912.
During the Balkan Wars of 1912/13, the
Ottoman Empire was soundly defeated by a coalition of Balkan States.
It lost all of its European provinces, except for the districts
located on the outskirts of Constantinople up to Adrianople. The
Balkan Wars were in a sense ‘total wars.’ Civilians were
not spared. Systematic massacres of populations that were considered
to be ‘alien’ became a daily occurrence. Besides its
military collapse in Europe, the Ottoman government faced a
humanitarian disaster. Coping with exhausted economic reserves, it
could hardly provide any assistance to the tens of thousands of
Muslim refugees arriving at the Straits, hoping to escape
extermination at the hands of the armies of the Balkan states by
fleeing into Asia Minor. However, the Ottoman army employed the same
strategy of ethnic cleansing as well. It even employed such brutal
methods against its own citizens. For instance, Ottoman units
displaced and massacred Ottoman Christian communities on their
advances from the Straits. They presumably did this because these
communities were considered as being unreliable and dangerous as long
as they remained in a strategically important area.
The peace negotiations at the end of the
Balkan Wars brought the unresolved Armenian Question back to the top
of the international diplomatic agenda. Dissatisfied with unfulfilled
government promises of the preceding years, Armenian representatives
lobbied for internationally secured guarantees for their communities.
After much maneuvering the European Powers agreed on a reform scheme
for six eastern provinces where the majority of the empire’s
rural Armenian population lived. The area was to be divided into two
regions, each of which would be under the supervision of a European
administrator who would supervise the implementation of reforms for
the benefit of all citizens. The CUP opposed the reform plan strongly
but was unable to block it. Thus, it took resort to a policy of
obstruction. It tried to man the administrators’ staff with
trusted CUP members while preventing the nomination of known local
Armenians.
In the west, the Ottoman government faced a
perceived Greek threat to its territorial integrity. Thus, it
continued its campaign against its Non-Muslim citizens. CUP
emissaries toured the Aegean coast of Asia Minor and organized with
local officials the assassination of Greeks and even massacres of
whole villages. The goal was to eliminate the Ottoman Greek
communities in these areas and replace them with Muslim refugees from
the Balkans. The campaign had to be conducted clandestinely for fear
of outside interference. Soon, Ottoman Greeks appealed for help to
the representatives of the European powers. In response, an
international commission was formed to inquire into the outrages.
While the Ottoman government did its best to obstruct the work of the
commission, the results, nevertheless, implicated the government and
the CUP as being responsible. Due to international diplomatic
pressures the government felt compelled to terminate its anti-Greek
campaign for the time being.
The beginning of World War I in Europe
provided the Ottoman government with a unique chance to free itself
of foreign intervention. International political circumstances were
very favorable to Ottoman designs. While the Triple-Entente hoped to
keep the Ottoman Empire neutral, the Central Powers and especially
Germany did their best to win it as an ally for their side. As a
result, the Ottoman government enjoyed an unprecedented degree of
political importance which it used right away. In October 1914 it
unilaterally abrogated those international treaties that had limited
Ottoman sovereignty as far as foreigners and foreign interests within
the empire had been concerned. With the abrogation of the so-called ‘Capitulations’
the CUP had achieved one of its major political goals. Since most
powers did not recognize the Ottoman move, the government did its
best to create facts. It moved swiftly against a group that seemed to
threaten Ottoman sovereignty from within in a very sensitive region.
Between October and December 1914, a special envoy of the Ottoman
Ministry of the Interior started an anti-Zionist campaign in Jaffa.
Local authorities harassed Zionist colonies and in December 1914 a
roundup of Jewish families in Jaffa ended with their deportation to
Egypt. The measures continued well into 1915. U.S. and German
protests seemed to have some impact when the campaign seemed to come
to a climax with threats against the Zionist leadership of the
empire.
Meanwhile the Ottoman war effort on the side
of the Central Powers had gained some momentum. By early1915,
however, all Ottoman campaigns on the Eastern front, in Persia, in
Mesopotamia, and on Sinai had failed. The setbacks were accompanied
by a tremendous loss of human life. Now, counter measures of the
Entente became a serious problem for the Ottoman General Staff. In
February, a combined British and French naval squadron attacked the
Dardanelles. German officers serving in the Ottoman army advised the
government that they could not guarantee a successful defense if the
attack were repeated. In panic, the Ottoman government prepared for
the evacuation of the capital. Meanwhile, on the eastern front
Ottoman army units and CUP cadres took their revenge for the Ottoman
defeats on the local Armenian population. Lack of food and other
supplies further induced these circles and army units to rob what
they could. Often, they were joined by Muslim civilians as well. In
areas where a Russian advance seemed probable, Ottoman units turned
to a scorched earth strategy and massacred wholesale Armenian
communities. In the city of Van, an Armenian center, the Armenians
resisted, however. The news of this defense together with
intelligence of an imminent and decisive attack at the Dardanelles
triggered a series of decisions within the highest echelons of the
Ottoman government and the CUP.
On April 24, Talaat, the Ottoman Minister of
the Interior, decreed the empire-wide arrest of Armenian community
leaders. At the same time, Armenians from Zeitoun that had been
deported from their town earlier to the interior provinces were to be
re-directed into the Syrian Desert. Thus, a repressive action
modelled on the earlier deportation policies turned into an
extermination campagin. Although the landing at the Dardanelles did
not result in a breakthrough, the Ottoman government did not reverse
its anti-Armenian policy. Within two weeks, the Armenian leadership
had been almost entirely arrested, tortured, and killed. Officially
the government legitimized its measures with an alleged widespread
Armenian conspiracy that aimed at the overthrow the government. The
Armenian Genocide had begun.
In May and June 1915, the Ottoman
authorities drafted a series of programs aimed at the complete
expropriation of all Armenian communities. With the partial
exceptions of a few places, all Armenians were to be deported and
forced to leave their belongings behind besides a few items. The
Ottoman government appropriated all assets and asserted itself as the
sole beneficiary of any claims due to deported and deceased
Armenians. The confiscations proceeded systemically according to a
pre-determined schedule and precise rules. Local officials were to
prevent any waste or thefts of assets. The Ottoman government even
concerned itself even with the proceeds from the sale of perishable
garden products like cucumbers. The confiscated goods were used
either for the supply of the army or sold exclusively to Muslims.
Muslim settlers took over Armenian farms, Muslim merchants Armenian
firms, and the government all Armenian schools, foundations, and
religious institutions. Although the government declared that the
deportations were a temporary measure, it was clear from the
beginning that these changes were for good. Within three months, all
Armenians settlements with very few and limited exceptions such as
Constantinople had ceased to exist.
Ottoman army units decimated the deportees
in a series of massacres along the route towards the Syrian desert,
the official destination for the victims. Some Armenian women and
children were spared, that is those who were considered to be at
least temporarily useful as sex-slaves or other cheap labor in army
industries, as shepherds, and the like. Those deportees who reached
the Syrian Desert mostly perished in extermination camps. The
authorities systematically exposed these victims to starvation,
dehydration, and a series of contagious diseases like typhus. Those
who survived these dangers were killed in a series of major massacres
in the summer of 1916. After these massacres, the Ottoman authorities
reduced the extent of the anti-Armenian program and slowly finished
off the last remnants.
Alongside the Armenians, Ottoman provincial
authorities targeted the Assyrian communities in areas around
Diarbekir, Mardin, and Siirt. Either simultaneously or shortly after
the massacre of the local Armenians, Assyrian communities were
eliminated in the same way. However, there is evidence that these
atrocities were not necessarily in harmony with the central
government’s wishes. A number of communities were spared
although they had offered armed resistance against being massacred.
Moreover, the central government saw to it that the confiscation
policy was executed in a different manner than in the case of the
Armenians.
The next ethnic group to be targeted were
the Kurds. Some Kurdish tribes and peasants had willingly joined the
Ottoman troops in the slaughter of the Armenians. Others, like Kurds
in Dersim, had resisted and organized the escape of Armenians to the
Russian lines. In response to this, the Ottoman army ordered the
deportation of Dersim Kurds to western provinces. The deportation of
the Dersim Kurds was, however, not an exception. Soon, whole tribal
confederations like the Hayderanli were deported towards the central
plateau of Asia Minor. This deportation was not motivated by the fear
of the advancing Russian army. The reason was the Ottoman government’s
goal to assimilate these Kurdish Muslims into the Turkish population.
Therefore, the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior decreed that tribal
and religious leaders had to be separated from their followers. The
latter were to be distributed in small numbers among exclusively
Turkish villages. Kurds had to cease to identify themselves as Kurds.
The authorities also sought to overcome religious differences like
the adherence of many Kurds to brands of Shiism. Local authorities
had to supply precise data on available Armenian property and the
capacity of given districts to ‘absorb’ Kurds. Thus, the
Ottoman Ministry of the Interior used those administrative units that
had been used to organize the destruction of the Armenians for the
assimilation of the Kurds. While Kurds were not, as a rule,
massacred, a major part of the deportees perished from want of food
and diseases as they often had to pass the same locations were
Armenians had been exterminated shortly before.
The deportation of the Kurds marked the
beginning of the second phase of the demographic reorganization of
the Ottoman Empire. A number of other and smaller groups were
included into the assimilation program as well, such as the
deportation of Druzes from the Hauran towards Asia Minor. Jewish
inhabitants of Zakho were targted like Iranian Shiites in
Mesopotamia. The assimilation of individuals was, however, only one
part of the restructuring. Besides the ‘turkification’ of
human beings, whole regions or critical localities were targeted as a
second major aspect of the government’s program. Therefore,
whole districts were designated as a ‘turkification region.’
Consequently, Ottoman officials did not allow Kurdish deportees
arriving from the eastern borders areas in the province of Diarbekir
and districts of Husnu Mansour and Ourfa to remain there as Muslims
from the Balkans had been earmarked as settlers for these regions.
Following the same logic, the central authorities criticized Djemal
Pasha for his lack of success with the turkification of Jerusalem.
Evidently, this important town deserved the special attention of the
Ottoman demographic planners.
The Muslims who were sent eastward were
refugees and immigrants newly arrived from the Balkans. Due to their
Slavic background, the Ottoman government regarded their religious
affiliation as insufficient to merit settlement in the western
provinces, comparably close to their places of origin. Enough emptied
villages would have been available for these immigrants as the
authorities had already deported all Greek villages in the Marmara
area and along the Aegean littoral. Throughout 1915 and 1916 Greek
villagers were deported inland and distributed in the same manner as
the Kurdish deportees among Turkish villages. None of these villages
was to be close to a railway line. The government intended to isolate
the deportees and prevent any meaningful Greek community life. In
1917, the anti-Greek campaign was fully extended to villages along
the Black Sea coast. Death-marching in snow storms and massacres
demonstrated that the increasingly deteriorating military situation
of the empire warranted a more aggressive campaign than before.
All deportations were planned, ordered, and
coordinated by the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior’s ‘Directorate
for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants’ at Constantinople.
At times, however, the directorate’s officials joined those of
the ministry’s ‘Directorate for Public Security’ on
the spot in the provinces when the situation demanded. Thus, a
relatively small number of high ranking administrators oversaw and
engineered the deportations and extermination of virtually millions
of Ottoman citizens. Most of them must be regarded as experts in
crimes against humanity. In the course of their careers they
repeatedly committed atrocities against the various groups targeted
by the Ottoman government and after World War I, the governments of
the Turkish Republic.
The experiences of Greeks, Armenians, Kurds,
and Balkan Muslims, as well as a many other smaller groups, cannot be
separated from each other as their treatment on the part of the
Ottoman government was enacted according to a single scheme. The
extermination of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915-1916 provided the
economic basis for a full-scale ethnic re-structuring of the Ottoman
provinces. This paper—based on original documentation from the
Ottoman Ministry of the Interior, U.S. and European consular,
diplomatic, and private archives and memoirs—will give an
account of the Ottoman government’s programs of social
engineering through deportation and genocide as far as the various
ethnic groups of the Ottoman Empire are concerned. It will become
apparent that an understanding of the Armenian Genocide and the
Ottoman government’s goals connected with it depend on a
broader approach.
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